"Blood, Sweat and Arrogance" is the title of the latest work of revisionist history by Gordon Corrigan. Carol got it for me as a birthday present, knowing how much I'd enjoyed his previous book, "Mud, Blood and Poppycock". "Mud, Blood and Poppycock" argues that the history of the British contribution to the First World War was effectively hijacked by lefties, war poets and the anti-war lobby, creating what is now the mythical view of the conflict as a criminal waste of life, senselesly protracted by a bunch of incompetent generals. This, Corrigan maintains, is a travesty of the truth. What really happened is that, despite appalling difficulties and set-backs, the British army drew significant lessons from its inevitable mistakes. By the end of the war it was the only allied force in the field capable of defeating the most magnificent fighting force the world had ever seen, the German Imperial Army. By that stage the French army was too exhausted and the American army too inexperienced to offer the same hardened fighting capability as the British. It was they that truly won the war.
"Blood, Sweat and Arrogance" sets out to do a job on the myth of British triumph in the Second World War with special emphasis on the role of Churchill. While acknowledging Churchill's vital contribution to rallying the nation with his matchless oratory, he goes on to catalogue a whole series of potentially catastrophic errors of judgement:
- Churchill's defence-cutting budgets while Chancellor of the Exchequer in the twenties was a significant element in Britain's relative unpreparedness for war in 1939.
-Churchill became Prime Minister after the fiasco of the Norwegian campaign for which he was largely responsible in his capacity as Lord of the Admiralty.
- He was an active hindrance to the generals during the North African campaign through his dangerous attempts at micro-management and his constant insistence on offensive action before troops and equipment were in a state of proper preparedness.
- He was responsible for the futile Greek expedition and the debacle of Crete which his generals had advised against.
- He sacked Wavell and Auchinleck, replacing them with the less competent Montgomery for PR rather than professional reasons.
- He pursued the "Soft Underbelly" policy of advancing through Italy, a costly and wasteful error of judgement.
- He pushed for the Dieppe raid, another tragic and unecessary failure.
- He was a powerful advocate of the bomber offensive on Germany, then ditched Harris when he became politically inconvenient.
- He insisted on maintaining Montgomery in charge of the British forces in Europe, despite his proven inability to work with Eisenhower.
Corrigan also gets to grips with a number of other myths about the British war effort:
- Dunkirk did not consist of a " flotilla of small boats" ferrying the troops across the Channel. There were small boats, but they were largely used to bring people out to larger vessels, not least requisitioned cross-Channel ferries.
- Despite "Blood, Sweat and Tears", a German invasion of Britain was never really on the cards. It would have required not only the prior destruction of the Royal Air force, but also of the Royal Navy which could reasonably have been expected to have tolerated almost any casualties in order to prevent the enemy effecting a landing.
- That the RAF was in fact saved from destruction by the Luftwaffe's decision to stop bombing airfields and radar stations and start bombing cities and towns.
- Montgomery was anything but a military genius. At El Alamein his predecessors had, through earlier defensive battles, left him in a position where he could hardly lose. In fact, his exploitation of his victory was pedestrian in the extreme. British progress on the Caen front after the D-day landings was painfully slow. His one attempt at a brilliant campaign, the Arnhem operation, was badly mismanaged.
- German troops were better trained, better equipped and better led than the British and, most importantly, much more flexible in responding to the challenges of battle.
And so on... Gordon Corrigan is an ex-soldier, which gives him an obvious advantage in understanding the practicalities of warfare. However, some of his laboured explanations of troop dispositions can get a bit wearing. Proper understanding would require a table-top map and the use of flag-markers! A retirement project, perhaps.
What Corrigan really does is collapse the myth which lies at the heart at the British "sense of nationhood". Britain did not win the war. Once Nazi Germany had contrived to find itself at war with Russia, Britain and America, it never had a hope in hell. The war served only to accelerate the end of empire and Britain's loss of prestige and influence in the world. John Bull's sense of racial superiority over Johnny Foreigner is built upon a myth, a self-flattering lie. It was even evident in the recent defeat of the English in the World Cup, as the frustrated master-race vented its collective spleen on the unsportsmanlike, cheating foreigner Ronaldo, who pretty much forced the lilywhite Wayne Rooney to stamp on an opponent's testicles while he was lying on the ground.
Tread carefully, for you are treading on my dreams!
"Blood, Sweat and Arrogance" sets out to do a job on the myth of British triumph in the Second World War with special emphasis on the role of Churchill. While acknowledging Churchill's vital contribution to rallying the nation with his matchless oratory, he goes on to catalogue a whole series of potentially catastrophic errors of judgement:
- Churchill's defence-cutting budgets while Chancellor of the Exchequer in the twenties was a significant element in Britain's relative unpreparedness for war in 1939.
-Churchill became Prime Minister after the fiasco of the Norwegian campaign for which he was largely responsible in his capacity as Lord of the Admiralty.
- He was an active hindrance to the generals during the North African campaign through his dangerous attempts at micro-management and his constant insistence on offensive action before troops and equipment were in a state of proper preparedness.
- He was responsible for the futile Greek expedition and the debacle of Crete which his generals had advised against.
- He sacked Wavell and Auchinleck, replacing them with the less competent Montgomery for PR rather than professional reasons.
- He pursued the "Soft Underbelly" policy of advancing through Italy, a costly and wasteful error of judgement.
- He pushed for the Dieppe raid, another tragic and unecessary failure.
- He was a powerful advocate of the bomber offensive on Germany, then ditched Harris when he became politically inconvenient.
- He insisted on maintaining Montgomery in charge of the British forces in Europe, despite his proven inability to work with Eisenhower.
Corrigan also gets to grips with a number of other myths about the British war effort:
- Dunkirk did not consist of a " flotilla of small boats" ferrying the troops across the Channel. There were small boats, but they were largely used to bring people out to larger vessels, not least requisitioned cross-Channel ferries.
- Despite "Blood, Sweat and Tears", a German invasion of Britain was never really on the cards. It would have required not only the prior destruction of the Royal Air force, but also of the Royal Navy which could reasonably have been expected to have tolerated almost any casualties in order to prevent the enemy effecting a landing.
- That the RAF was in fact saved from destruction by the Luftwaffe's decision to stop bombing airfields and radar stations and start bombing cities and towns.
- Montgomery was anything but a military genius. At El Alamein his predecessors had, through earlier defensive battles, left him in a position where he could hardly lose. In fact, his exploitation of his victory was pedestrian in the extreme. British progress on the Caen front after the D-day landings was painfully slow. His one attempt at a brilliant campaign, the Arnhem operation, was badly mismanaged.
- German troops were better trained, better equipped and better led than the British and, most importantly, much more flexible in responding to the challenges of battle.
And so on... Gordon Corrigan is an ex-soldier, which gives him an obvious advantage in understanding the practicalities of warfare. However, some of his laboured explanations of troop dispositions can get a bit wearing. Proper understanding would require a table-top map and the use of flag-markers! A retirement project, perhaps.
What Corrigan really does is collapse the myth which lies at the heart at the British "sense of nationhood". Britain did not win the war. Once Nazi Germany had contrived to find itself at war with Russia, Britain and America, it never had a hope in hell. The war served only to accelerate the end of empire and Britain's loss of prestige and influence in the world. John Bull's sense of racial superiority over Johnny Foreigner is built upon a myth, a self-flattering lie. It was even evident in the recent defeat of the English in the World Cup, as the frustrated master-race vented its collective spleen on the unsportsmanlike, cheating foreigner Ronaldo, who pretty much forced the lilywhite Wayne Rooney to stamp on an opponent's testicles while he was lying on the ground.
Tread carefully, for you are treading on my dreams!
posted by asbo at 12:41 PM
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